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Because heterogenous and unknown shareholder utility functions make it difficult to define a
corporate objective common to all shareholders based on utility, the traditional theory of the
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mance (TPM) that reflects the preferences of all risk averse shareholders towards all aspects
of risk. We verify empirically that this is, in fact, the case for the first four moments of a large
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conflict as the analytical framework, we show that TPM is a reliable, multi-dimensional per-
formance measure and that one dimensional performance measures, such as mean returns,
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1 Introduction
The cornerstone concept of performance and the “corporate objective” in the traditional
theory of the firm is shareholder wealth maximization.1 For example, the corporate agency
conflict literature,2 sparked by the seminal paper of Jensen and Meckling (1976), has focused
for the most part on some form of wealth creation, such as stock returns or Tobin’s Q, and
has ignored how stock returns or the changes in Tobin’s Q are distributed.3 Modern invest-
ment theory, however, has shown the importance of the distribution of wealth outcomes as
well as the level of wealth itself.4 Although the literatures on corporate finance and modern
investment theory are both based on the principle of utility maximization (see, for example,
Ross 1973; Jensen and Meckling 1976), heterogenous and unknown shareholder utility func-
tions make it difficult to define a firm goal common to all shareholders based on maximum
utility. In other words, all unsatiated, risk averse shareholders prefer more to less, but their
attitudes to volatility, skewness, kurtosis, etc. can vary according to each individual utility
function, thereby isolating wealth maximization as the only obvious preference common to
all investors. The Fisher Separation Theorem shows that in a short run, partial equilibrium
framework where no risk exists or where it can be perfectly hedged, return distributions can
be excluded from the analysis and that wealth maximization is the common firm goal that
also maximizes shareholder utility.5
Excluding return distributions from the analysis overcomes the problem of heterogenous
shareholders with different and unknown utility functions, but it comes at the cost of ignoring
crucial information affecting shareholder preferences and investment decision making, which
is at the heart of utility theory and modern portfolio analysis. Consider, for example, two
firms with the same mean returns and the same volatility but firm A has positive skewness
and low kurtosis while firm B has negative skewness and high kurtosis. Since it is well known
that investors show a preference for positive skewness and an aversion to kurtosis (see, Kraus
and Litzenberger 1976; Athayde and Flôres 2000; Fang and Lai 1997; Dittmar 2002; Post
et al. 2008), other things being equal, investment A would be preferred to investment B by
any risk averse investor.
1 See Machlup (1967) and Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a) for a summary of the background debate. Sundaram
and Inkpen (2004a) provide a recent literature review and make a strong argument that shareholder wealth
maximization is the best among all available alternatives, and thus the preferred goal for managers formulating
and implementing strategy. Sundaram and Inkpen (2004b) highlight the weaknesses of stakeholder theory
presented in Freeman et al. (2004).
2 There is a huge and growing literature on the principal-agent conflict. For some of the best original work,
see: Berle and Means (1932), Coase (1937), Cyert and March (1963), Williamson (1964), Machlup (1967),
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976).
3 For example, studies that have used stock returns as a performance proxy include Kirchmaier and Grant
(2005), Zhang (2009) and Von Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014). Studies that have used Tobin’s Q include
McConnell and Servaes (1990), De Miguel et al. (2004), Morck et al. (1988), Short and Keasey (1999), Faccio
and Lasfer (1999) and Holderness et al. (1999), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), and Davies et al. (2005).
4 For example, mean–variance (MV) analysis, the most popular model of utility maximization, looks at the
trade-offs between the first and second moments (the mean and the variance) of the distribution of wealth
outcomes. Given that the conditions for MV to be analytically consistent with expected utility maximization,
such as quadratic utility functions and/or normally distributed returns, seldom hold in practice, risk measures
other than variance must also be considered. It has been shown that the third and the fourth moments of return
distributions—skewness and kurtosis respectively—do matter to investors, who show a preference for positive
skewness and an aversion to kurtosis (see, Kraus and Litzenberger 1976; Athayde and Flôres 2000; Fang and
Lai 1997; Dittmar 2002; Post et al. 2008).
5 See Fisher (1930) for a presentation of the theorem and Machlup (1967) for a summary of the subsequent
background debate.
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This paper seeks to fill this void by developing a measure of firm performance compatible
with the preferences of all risk averse shareholders that incorporates all the moments of
the distribution—including the mean, the variance, the skewness and the kurtosis as well
as all the higher moments. The total performance measure (TPM) we propose reflects the
relative performance of the firm with respect to the market portfolio ranked by the marginal
utilities of all risk averse shareholders. By including shareholder preferences towards risk
in the measure of firm performance, we bring together the corporate finance literature and
the literature on portfolio investment theory and practice. We argue that TPM contains a
different set of information that can be useful in understanding the complicated relationships
between decision making and firm performance. Our approach is very general. We make no
assumptions about the return distributions, the specific form of the utility functions or the
efficiency of the market portfolio. The only assumptions are that investors are risk averse and
hold their wealth in the market portfolio.
The empirical testing involves two stages. First, we show that TPM does reflect the indi-
vidual moments of the return distribution. We then use TPM to study the effect of managerial
ownership (MO) on firm performance, the well-known manager/shareholder agency conflict
has been a major issue in economics and management science for over 70 years. We show
that there is a significant quartic relationship between firm performance measured as TPM
and MO, a relationship with a straightforward interpretation for the risk averse shareholder’s
utility over each interval. When we examine the relationship between MO and other measures
of firm performance, such as returns, return volatility, skewness and kurtosis, the effects on
whether or not they enhance the risk averse shareholder’s utility are often conflicting. This
is evidence that the individual moments provide only a partial and potentially misleading
picture of overall stock performance that is difficult to interpret when standing alone. It is
also evidence that the more comprehensive TPM provides additional insights into firm perfor-
mance. We pursue this proposition and show that after orthogonalizing TPM with respect to
Tobin’s Q, another common measure of firm performance, TPM retains a significant amount
of performance information. These results are robust to controls for endogeneity, institutional
ownership, firm size, leverage, firm age, and auditing quality.
This paper extends the previous literature by adding a basic but versatile measure of firm
performance to the corporate finance empirical literature that goes beyond wealth to include
the distribution of wealth outcomes as well. As such, it refines the corporate objective to
reflect utility maximization and brings together the portfolio investment and corporate finance
literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the frame-
work and methodology for constructing TPM. Section 3 analyzes TPM in the framework
of the manager/shareholder agency conflict. Section 4 compares the information content of
TPM with other popular performance measures, such as Tobin’s Q and the raw moments of
the return distribution. Section 5 concludes.
2 Total firm performance: framework andmethodology
To construct the utility based proxy for firm performance, noted as TPM, we proceed as
follows. We assume that shareholder wealth is represented by the market portfolio and that
shareholders are rational, non-satiating and risk averse. Each investor has a utility function
u(r ) satisfying the following conditions:
u′(r ) ≥ 0, u′′(r ) ≤ 0 ∀r (1)
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Fig. 1 Graph of a risk averse utility function y ln(x)
where primes denote derivatives and r is the rate of return of an investment. Let xi represent
the percent of asset i in the market portfolio, rM  ∑ni1 xiri represent the return on the
market, and qi  xi (ri − rM ) represent the change in rM due to asset i. The contribution to
utility by asset i can be found by expanding u(rM − qi ) in a Taylor series around rM and
ignoring terms above the first derivative:
u(rM − qi )  u(rM ) − qi u′(rM ) (2)
where qi  xi (ri − rM ). Rearranging gives:
u(rM )  u(rM − qi ) + qi u′(rM ) (3)
Thus, asset i’s contribution to utility is equal to qi u′(rM )  xi (ri − rM )u′(rM ). For a given
value of qi the contribution to total utility depends on rM . Since u′′(r ) ≤ 0 , the contribution
will be greater the lower the level of rM . For example, in Fig. 1 an increase in one unit of
wealth from 3 to 4 on the x-axis increases utility on the y-axis by approximately 0.3, whereas
an increase of one unit of wealth from 16 to 17 only increases it by about 0.1.
Because the marginal utilities of individual shareholders are different and unknown, we
cannot estimate the utility of specific shareholders. To overcome this problem, we build on
the condition of decreasing marginal utility and rank the states of nature according to the
returns on the market portfolio from lowest to highest. Ranking in this way is equivalent to
ranking by decreasing marginal utility for each shareholder because utility is defined over
total wealth reflected in the market portfolio.6 Thus, all risk averse shareholders, regardless
of their individual utility functions and ownership in the company, must be in agreement
with this ranking. Individual shareholders may not derive the same marginal utility from
returns on the market portfolio, but they all agree on the ranking of the marginal utilities
of these returns. From this it is clear that the ranking of the states of nature with respect to
portfolio returns is the necessary and sufficient information to provide a ranking with respect
to marginal utility. We can use this ranking to derive a measure of performance for each firm
that reflects decreasing marginal utility.
We start by matching the returns on each firm with the ranked returns on the market port-
folio. We then calculate (ri − rM ), the difference between the firm returns and the returns on
6 This type of ordering is similar to that found in Shalit and Yitzhaki (1994).
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the market portfolio, for each value of rM . These differences reflect the relative performance
of each firm with respect to the market portfolio at each state of nature. The higher (lower)
the difference, the better (worse) is the relative performance.
The partial performance measure we propose is based on the statistic developed by Chow
(2001) calculated as the average excess return, E(ri − rM ), divided by its standard deviation.
This test is designed to reflect the effect of decreasing marginal utility on performance. It
follows a studentized maximum modulus distribution. The critical values are available in
Stoline and Ury (1979). It has been used primarily in studies based on marginal conditional
stochastic dominance (e.g. Clark et al. 2011; Belghitar et al. (2011); Clark and Kassimatis
2013). Its construction involves dividing the vector of relative performance for each firm into
deciles.7 We use the deciles to form subsamples of the data that we use to construct partial
performance measures for each firm. The first subsample is comprised of return differences
obtained from the first decile of the ranking. The second subsample is comprised of return
differences obtained from the first and second deciles of the ranking. The third subsample is
comprised of return differences obtained from the first, second and third deciles and so on,
until the whole distribution is included in the final subsample. This can be written formally
as:
Zk(τi )  
k(τi )
Sˆk(τi )
, for i  1, . . . , m. (4)
where
¯k(τi )  rpk I (τi ) − rM I (τi ), i  1, 2, . . . , m and k  1, 2, . . . , K, (5)
and k(τi ) is the mean excess conditional return of stock k relative to the market portfolio
below a target rate of return τ . The index i denotes the set of prespecified target rates of
return. Sˆk(τi ) is the estimated standard error of k(τi ) and I (τi ) is an indicator variable such
that I (τi ) 1 if rM≤τ and 0 otherwise.8 Using deciles, (i.e. i 1,…, 10), gives 10 individual
Z statistics as partial performance measures.
It is important to note that we make no assumptions about any of the return distributions,
such that each partial performance measure reflects the complete empirical distribution of a
firm’s returns compared to the return on the market over each subsample. Since it is measured
over the entire empirical distribution of each subsample, it will also reflect all the moments
of the distribution of the subsamples, including the third, fourth and higher moments. TPM
is calculated as the average of these ten partial performance measures. It reflects the attribute
of decreasing marginal utility by giving more weight to the outcomes at the lower states of
nature. For example, the outcomes of the first decile count for approximately 28.5% of TPM,
the outcomes of the second decile for approximately 19.5%, etc.
As an example of how TPM is calculated, consider a period of 50 working days, which
gives 50 daily returns for the market portfolio (M) and stock i. First, market returns are
ranked from lowest to highest and matched with the corresponding returns of stock i so that
the return on stock i is conditional on the return on the market portfolio. The sample is then
split into deciles, each consisting of 5 pairs. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 1 report the 15 lowest
7 There is no “correct” percentile for the subsamples. The percentile must be large enough to avoid rank
reversal with respect to marginal utility but contain enough observations for statistical inference. For example,
when the sample is broken down by deciles, the first ten percent of observations count for 29.5% of the TPM
statistic. When broken down into quintiles, the first ten observations count for only 22.8% of the TPM statistic.
In the context of MCSD Chow (2001) recommends deciles.
8 For detailed information on the Z test, see Chow (2001).
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Table 1 Steps in the calculation of TPM
Obs. RM (%) Ri (%) Ri −RM (%) Aver.
(Ri −RM)
St.Dev.
(Ri −RM)
Z
(Aver/st.dev)
1 −9.00 −7.60 1.40
2 −7.50 −7.60 −0.10
3 −7.20 −7.00 0.20
4 −7.10 −6.40 0.70
5 −6.80 −5.20 1.60 (obs. 1–5)
0.76%
(obs. 1–5)
0.737%
1.03
6 −5.50 −5.10 0.40
7 −4.90 −5.10 −0.20
8 −4.80 −6.00 −1.20
9 −4.70 −5.20 −0.50
10 −4.10 −3.50 0.60 (obs. 1–10)
0.29%
(obs. 1–10)
0.848%
0.34
11 −3.82 −4.10 −0.28
12 −3.00 −2.20 0.80
13 −2.10 −1.80 0.30
14 −1.96 −2.25 −0.29
15 −1.70 0.50 2.20 (obs. 1–15)
0.38%
(obs. 1–15)
0.884%
0.42
The table provides a hypothetical example for the construction of TPM (Total Performance Measure). RM is
the daily market return sorted in ascending order, Ri is the respective daily stock return, Aver. (Ri −RM) is
the average difference between Ri and RM, St.Dev. (Ri −RM) is the standard deviation of Ri −RM and Z is
calculated as the average (Ri −RM) divided by the standard deviation of (Ri −RM). The table reports 3 of
the 10 deciles in the hypothetical example. TPM is the average Z value over the 10 deciles
hypothetical returns for the market portfolio and the corresponding returns for stock i. For
example, the 3rd lowest return of the market portfolio during the 50 day period was −7.2%.
On that day the return of stock i was −7%. The third step is to calculate the difference for
each pair of returns, which is reported in the 4th column of the table. Next, we calculate
the average difference in returns for the first 5 observations, the first 10 observations, the
first 15 observations, and so on, until we include the entire sample. Finally, we calculate the
standard deviation of the differences in returns [St.Dev.(Ri −RM)] reported in column 5. The
Z statistic is calculated as the average difference in returns divided by the standard deviation
of these differences for each sub-sample. In the hypothetical example, the TPM statistic is
the equally weighted average of the ten Z statistics for the 50 day period. In the analysis that
follows, TPM is calculated on an annual basis, employing daily returns over each calendar
year.
By design, TPM should reflect the range of shareholder preferences embedded in the return
distributions. To test this proposition we use a sample that includes all listed non financial firms
on three US exchanges—New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange
(AMEX), and Nasdaq—for the period 2002–2010. The market portfolio is proxied by the
S&P 500. We then regress TPM on the first four moments of the return distributions with
respect to the market portfolio, i.e. excess returns (ERET), covariance (COV), coskewness
(COSK) and cokurtosis (COKU). In this way we control for market based effects while
respecting that TPM is measured against the market portfolio. Thus, we offer the following
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Table 2 The relationship between TPM and Excess returns
(1) (2)
ERET 240.4** 236.0**
(45.13) (77.03)
COV −7095.3** −5178.2**
(−67.68) (−96.27)
COSK 0.336** 0.451**
(2.14) (4.50)
COKU −8.392* −8.353**
(−1.86) (−7.27)
Constant 2.005** 1.906**
(31.26) (130.14)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes
Firm-fixed effects Yes
N 14,728 14,728
Adj. R2 0.547 0.501
The dependent variable is total performance measure (TPM). ERET is the annual average excess daily stock
returns including dividends. COV is the covariance between the annual daily stock returns and the daily
returns of the market portfolio, COSK is the co-skewness and COKU is the co-kurtosis between a firm’s
returns and the market portfolio’s returns. The coefficients’ standard errors are based on adjusted for the
effects of non-independence by clustering on each firm (Petersen 2009). t statistics in parentheses. *p < 0.10l;
**p < 0.05
specification, where the coefficients’ standard errors are adjusted for the effects of non-
independence by clustering on each firm:
T P Mit  κ0 + κ1 E RETit + κ2C OVit + κ3C O SKit + κ4C O KUit + εi t (6)
where ERET, COV, COSK and COKU are the explanatory variables defined above, the κ ′s
are estimated coefficients and εt is the error term.
Table 2 reports the results. The adjusted R2 is over 50% in both specifications, the four
explanatory variables are highly significant in both specifications and have the right signs for
risk averse investors with decreasing absolute risk aversion. Average excess returns and
coskewness have a positive coefficient while covariance and cokurtosis have a negative
coefficient. This is strong evidence that TPM reflects the individual moments of the return
distribution and that it is compatible with utility maximization for risk averse investors, which
makes it a good proxy for firm performance.
3 Managerial ownership and firm performance
We now turn to the application of TPM to an important problem in the corporate finance
literature, the effect of managerial ownership (MO) on firm performance. The effect of
managerial ownership on the manager/shareholder agency conflict has been a major issue in
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economics and management science for over seventy years.9 The conflict, which arises when
corporate ownership is separate from corporate control and the interests of managers and
shareholders diverge, can result in opportunistic behavior by managers that is incompatible
with their mandate to act in the best interest of shareholders.10 The seminal paper of Jensen
and Meckling (1976) argued that this “agency conflict” can be mitigated through managerial
compensation that aligns the interests of managers and shareholders.11
The initial thrust of the literature that analyzes the effect of managerial ownership on firm
performance was that greater managerial ownership benefits shareholders because it increases
managers’ incentives to accept riskier, more profitable projects that increase firm value (e.g.
Jensen and Meckling 1976; Morck et al. 1988; Stulz 1988; Tosi et al. 1997).12 Other studies
pointed out, however, that if managers own a substantial percentage of a firm’s shares, they
may try to entrench themselves in the company they manage13 by over-investing (empire
building)14 and accepting negative present value projects that reduce corporate wealth (e.g.
Demsetz 1983; and Fama and Jensen 1983).15 Another strand of the literature focuses on the
principle of diversification. Acharya and Bisin (2009) argue that managers are restricted in
trading the stock of the firm they manage and, thus, they cannot diversify their firm specific
risk through the financial markets. However, they are not restricted in trading other securities
so they may favor projects with greater market risk, but which is diversifiable and can be
hedged in the financial markets using instruments such as stock indices. The higher market
risk increases the firm’s cost of capital and reduces the firm’s market value. Thus, because of
under-diversification, higher levels of managerial ownership decrease firm value and increase
the misalignment between managerial and shareholder interests.16
In the traditional theory of the firm, the empirical literature has focused for the most
part on some form of wealth creation, such as stock returns or Tobin’s Q, and has ignored
how stock returns or the changes in Tobin’s Q are distributed. For example, Kirchmaier and
9 There is a huge and growing literature on the principal-agent conflict. For some of the best original work,
see: Berle and Means (1932), Coase (1937), Cyert and March (1963), Williamson (1964), Machlup (1967),
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976).
10 See, for example, Denis et al. (1999) and Dalton et al. (2007). More generally, Eisenhardt (1989) and Nyberg
et al. (2010) show how agency theory can help us gain a better understanding of organizational behavior.
11 For a discussion of MO and risk sharing incentives in the agricultural sector see Stiglitz (1974). Spence and
Zeckhauser (1971) deal with the difficulty and cost of monitoring an agent’s actions in the insurance sector.
12 The positive relationship between managerial ownership and risk is also reflected in the debt market. For
example, Shaw (2012) shows that yield spreads are higher for firms whose CEOs hold more shares and stock
options.
13 Berger et al. (1997, p. 1411) define entrenchment as: “The extent to which managers fail to experience
discipline from the full range of corporate governance mechanisms, including monitoring by the board, the
threat of dismissal or takeover, and stock or compensation-based performance incentives.”
14 One manifestation of the entrenchment hypothesis is the choice by the CEO of a board of directors that
cannot monitor him. For an empirical examination on the matter see: Coles et al. (2008), Faccio and Lasfer
(1999) and Guest (2008). Chang et al. (2013) have shown that cash is more likely used to finance acquisitions
when target management ownership levels are high, which is consistent with a reduced monitoring hypothesis,
where bidding firm managers seek to avoid the formation of a large block holder that may become an active
monitor.
15 Aggarwal and Samwick (2006) find that the empire-building hypothesis has been over-stated. Instead, they
find that managers under-invest and that this problem can be addressed through properly designed incentive
packages for the managers.
16 The evidence for this argument is ambiguous. Brockman et al. (2010) document a negative relationship
between managerial ownership and financial alignment while others, such as Liu and Mauer (2011), and Daniel
and Naveen (2004) provide evidence of a positive relationship. Coles et al. (2006) provide evidence for both
types of relationship.
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Grant (2005), Zhang (2009) and Von Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) have used stock
returns as a performance proxy. Another important strand of this literature uses Tobin’s Q
to test for non-linearity. McConnell and Servaes (1990) find quadratic non-linearity while
De Miguel et al. (2004) find quadratic and cubic non-linearity; Morck et al. (1988), Short
and Keasey (1999), Faccio and Lasfer (1999) and Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999)
(for their 1935 sample) find cubic non-linearity; Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) find quartic
non-linearity and Davies et al. (2005) find the non-linearity is quintic.
The overall thrust of the empirical literature suggests that there is a significant, non-linear
relationship between firm value and managerial ownership, but besides Gadhoum and Ayadi
(2003), who examine how ownership structure affects the volatility of Canadian companies
and identify a non-linear positive relationship between volatility and managerial ownership,
and Chen and Steiner (1999), who find a similar relationship for U.S. companies, there has
been little or no research on how MO affects the distribution of wealth outcomes.
Using TPM as a performance measure provides some interesting insights into the foregoing
discussion. It furnishes evidence that firm performance does change as a result of a change
in investment strategy due to incentives embedded in different levels of MO and that this
change includes changes in shareholder returns as well as how these returns are distributed.
It also shows that overall performance that reflects all the moments of wealth outcomes can
differ sharply from the one dimensional performance measures considered in the literature.
3.1 Sample description
The sample includes the sample described above of all listed non financial firms on three US
exchanges—New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and
Nasdaq—for the period 2002–2010 with available data for the analysis. Specific firm data was
obtained from Worldscope. Data on firm ownership structure was obtained from Thomson
One Banker. Following Holderness et al. (1999), Helwege et al. (2007), and Fahlenbrach and
Stulz (2009), managerial ownership, MO, is measured as the percentage of total shares held
by firm executive directors.17,18 The market portfolio used to calculate TPM is proxied by
the S&P 500.
We consider a number of control variables suggested in the empirical studies on the
relationship between managerial ownership and stock performance. Given the dearth of
theoretical analysis and empirical evidence relating the control variables to third and higher
moments of the return distribution, we have no strong priors on the signs of the control
variables with respect to any of the dependent variables. The first control variable is the size
effect (SIZE), measured as the log of total assets (see, e.g. Florackis et al. 2009). The second
control variable is financial distress, represented by leverage (LEV), measured as total debt to
total assets. The third control variable is dividend yield (DIV), measured as total cash dividend
to total assets. The fourth control variable is institutional ownership (INST), measured as the
percentage of the total number of shares held by financial institutions. The fifth and sixth
control variables are firm age (AGE), defined as the number of years since firm creation,
suggested by Bennett et al. (2003), and auditing quality (AUD4) represented by a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if the audit firm is from the Big 4 and zero otherwise.
After excluding firms without the requisite ownership information and firm specifics, the
17 Relevant data are available from 2002.
18 We use this measure for two reasons. First, since modern corporations are typically managed by a “team”,
it corresponds best to the agency theory proposition. Second, it makes our results comparable with previous
studies (also see, Thomsen and Pedersen 2000).
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final unbalanced sample consists of 2936 firms for the period 2002–2009. Table 3 reports
correlations between our variables and Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for the data series.
3.2 Empirical results
One important question to be addressed in the analysis is whether the empirical results are the
interpretation of equilibrium or out-of-equilibrium phenomena. In equilibrium managerial
ownership is likely to be endogenously determined (Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Demsetz and
Villalonga 2001). According to Core et al. (2003), the interpretation depends largely on the
magnitude of adjustment costs in correcting suboptimal contracts. For example, when the
costs of ownership adjustments are high, managerial ownership will change only occasionally.
Demsetz (1983) argues that firms are not able to re-contract because they are hindered by
the large adjustment costs. This implies that the optimal managerial ownership rests on the
firm’s contracting environment that may change over time (Cheung and Wei 2006).
To account for sub-optimal contracting, we examine the managerial-performance relation
in a dynamic setting. The dynamic setting recognizes the possibility that firms adjust to their
targeted managerial ownership levels gradually over time and sheds light on the dynamics
of managerial ownership and its relationship to changes in firm performance.
We employ the following dynamic panel data specification:
T P Mit  γ T P Mit−1 +
4∑
j1
(
ς j M O jit
)
+ δXit + ni + λt + ξi t (7)
where TPM is the dependent variable, the total performance measure, MO is managerial
ownership, and X is a vector of control variables that include institutional ownership (INST ),
firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV ), dividends (DIV ), and firm age (AGE). The parameter
γ is a scalar, ς and δ are k-dimensional vectors of coefficients. The variables ni and λt
are respectively unobserved firm fixed effects and time effects that capture the effects of
unobserved firm heterogeneity and economy-wide factors that are outside the firm’s control.
Similarly, the lagged dependent variable in Eq. (7) is allowed to be correlated with unobserved
heterogeneity.
The problems of endogeneity outlined above suggest the use of an instrumental variables
(IV) methodology to estimate Eq. (7), where the lagged dependent variable (TPMit−1) and
endogenous regressors (MO) are instrumented. The preferred estimator for Eq. (7) is the Gen-
eralised Method of Moments (GMM) system estimator (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell
and Bond 1998) because: (a) the panel consists of a small number of time periods (small
T ) and a large number of firms (large N); (b) the dependent variable (TPM) is dynamic, in
the sense that it depends on past realizations;19 (c) the GMM system explicitly allows for
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within firms.
Following Arellano and Bover (1995), the dynamic performance model is estimated by
the forward orthogonal deviations transform in order to purge the data of unobserved firm
heterogeneity.20 Thus, the GMM system estimator combines a set of orthogonal deviation
19 This is intuitively true, as a firm’s performance is likely to experience time clustering (Magalhaes et al.
2008). Moreover, Bond (2002, p. 1) argues that “even when coefficients on lagged dependent variables are not
of direct interest, allowing for dynamics in the underlying process may be crucial for recovering consistent
estimates of other parameters.”
20 The main advantage of orthogonal transformation over first differences is that the former reduces the loss
of observations when the panel data is unbalanced (for more discussion, see Gorbachev 2011).
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean SD Median Min Max
TPM 0.443 1.857 0.345 −3.413 6.112
Q 5.160 108.89 1.730 0.030 10,272.87
ERET 0.0001 0.002 0 −0.025 0.027
COV 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 −0.0009 0.002
COSK −0.0126 0.077 −0.0013 −1.232 1.706
COKU 0.0004 0.006 0 0 0.662
MO 0.046 0.118 0 0 0.620
INST 0.212 0.208 0.150 0 0.780
SIZE 12.823 2.083 12.782 8.115 17.741
LEV 0.216 0.231 0.154 0 1.048
DIV 0.010 0.025 0 0 0.181
AGE 26.442 24.710 18 1 111
AUD4 0.3985 0.489 0 0 1
TPM is the total performance measure. Q is Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of the market value of assets to
the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is measured as the book value of assets less the book
value of equity plus the market value of equity ERET is the annual average excess daily stock returns including
dividends. COV is the covariance between the annual daily stock returns and the daily returns of the market
portfolio, COSK is the co-skewness and COKU is the co-kurtosis between a firm’s returns and the market
portfolio’s returns.MO is the total number of shares held by firm executive directors to total number of shares.
INST is the total shares held by financial institutions to total number of shares. SIZE is the natural logarithm
of total assets. LEV is total debts to total assets. DIV is total cash dividends to total assets. AGE is the age of
a company measured as the number of years since incorporation date. AUD4 is a dummy variable indicating
whether a company is audited by one of the big four auditing companies. All variables are winsorized at the
1 and 99% percentiles, respectively
equations with equations in levels, where instrumental variables are generated within the
system. The consistency of the GMM estimates is subject to an optimal choice of instruments
and the absence of higher-order serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term, ξ it .
To determine the order of non-linearity we employed a stepwise procedure starting with
the quadratic. The squared variable was significant at the 5% level. We then added the cubed
variable, which was significant at the 5% level without reducing the significance or changing
the sign of the squared variable. When we added the variable raised to the 4th power it was
significant without reducing the significance or changing the signs of the squared and cubed
variables. The variable raised to the 5th power was not significant at any conventional level.
Thus, we concluded that the quartic relationship was appropriate for our sample.
The results of the GMM system of tests are reported in Table 5. The Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions is not significant, indicating that the instruments used in the GMM
estimation are not correlated with the error term (i.e. valid instruments). As expected, the
AR(1) and AR(2) tests confirm the existence of serial correlation of order one, but not of
order two. The results suggest that the dynamic nature of firm performance is not rejected.
Specifically, the estimated coefficient of the previous year’s performance (TPMt−1) is positive
and significant. The adjustment speed (which is given by 1−γ) for model 1 is 0.575 and model
2 is 0.568. This gives, on average, an adjustment speed of 0.571. This is equivalent to a Koyck
duration interval of 5.34 with p 95%, where p is the percentage of the decay. This implies
that it requires 5.34 years to complete a 95% adjustment, suggesting that adjustment costs
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Table 5 GMM system results for
TPM
(1) (2)
TPM TPM
TPMt−1 0.425** 0.432**
(17.03) (17.43)
MO −18.46**
(−5.70)
MO2 151.0**
(4.40)
MO3 −375.5**
(−3.57)
MO4 286.2**
(2.99)
MO [0–8.7%] −8.767**
(−6.89)
MO (8.7–32%] 4.709**
(4.37)
MO (32–57.2%] −3.181*
(−1.68)
MO (57.2–100%] −10.69
(−0.81)
INST −0.597** −0.630**
(−4.77) (−5.04)
SIZE −0.261** −0.267**
(−9.69) (−9.70)
LEV 1.860** 1.887**
(7.17) (7.24)
DIV 3.777** 4.154**
(2.30) (2.53)
AGE 0.0267** 0.0265**
(11.56) (11.39)
AUD4 −0.398 −0.317
(−1.56) (−1.20)
Constant 2.683** 2.736**
(10.77) (10.79)
N 13,017 13,017
F-test 139.45** 139.89**
Sargan test 8.61 13.50
AR (1) −28.45** −28.72**
AR (2) 0.57 0.58
The dependent variable is TPM,
the total performance measure.
MO is the level of managerial
ownership and is measured as the
number of shares held by firm
executive directors to total
number of shares. MO2 is the
square term of MO, MO3 is the
cube term of MO and MO4 is the
cubic term of MO. MO [0–8.7%],
(8.7–32%], (32–57.2%] and
(57.2–100%] are sub-samples of
MO based on the level of
managerial ownership. INST is
the total shares held by financial
institutions to total number of
shares. SIZE is the natural
logarithm of total assets. LEV is
total debts to total assets. DIV is
total cash dividends to total
assets. AGE is the age of the
company. AUD4 is a dummy
variable indicating whether a
company is audited by one of the
big four auditing companies. The
models are estimated using
GMM System and include year
dummies. Columns (1) and (2)
give the GMM system estimates
where all the independent
variables are treated as
endogenous. Second lag period
and earlier are used as
instruments. F-test is a test of the
joint significance of reported
coefficient estimates under null
hypothesis. Sargan test is a test of
overidentifying restrictions under
the null of instrument validity.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for
first and second order serial
correlation in residuals. *p
< 0.10; **p < 0.05
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are quite high.21 This finding along with the instrumented MO is consistent with Demsetz’s
(1983) argument which suggests that firms are not able to re-contract because they face
substantial adjustment costs when they wish to adjust to the equilibrium level of managerial
ownership, where the optimal level is not constant over time and moves with the changes in
the determinants of firm performance.
As indicated in Eq. (7), we test for the nonlinearity by including in the analysis the square
root, the cube and the quartic of managerial ownership (MO2, MO3, MO4). Consistent with
prior studies, all MO coefficients are statistically significant (model 1) suggesting that the
relationship between TPM and MO is not linear. The quartic relationship suggests that there
are four distinct managerial ownership intervals with three turning points. Given this evidence,
in model 2 we consider a piecewise linear specification to test the relationship between TPM
and MO over each interval. The turning points can be optimally derived by taking the first
derivative of
ς4 M O4 + ς3 M O3 + ς2 M O2 + ς1 M O (8)
and setting it equal to zero. This gives
4ς4 M O3 + 3ς3 M O2 + 2ς2 M O + ς1  0 (9)
Solving for MO gives turning points at 8.7, 32 and 57.2%
Since ς1  − 18.46, the interval between 0 and 8.7% is downward sloping and 8.7% is
a local minimum. This result is evidence of the under-diversification theory of managerial
misalignment with shareholder preferences. The most likely explanation for the negative rela-
tionship is that at low levels of ownership, increased ownership increases the costs associated
with under-diversification more than the potential gains from the shareholder friendly projects
that would improve TPM. These costs can also be exacerbated by issues such as restrictions
on short sales, restrictions on trading during blackout periods, and required minimum levels
of stock ownership.
With ς2  151.0, the interval between 8.7 and 32% is upward sloping with a local maxi-
mum at 32%. This is strong evidence supporting managerial alignment. With the coefficient
ς3  −375.5 negative, the interval between 32 and 57.2% is negative with a local minimum
at 57.2%. This result supports the argument for entrenchment and/or empire building. The
coefficient ς4  286.2 is positive, which means that the fourth interval is positive. This
result supports the argument that at high levels of MO managerial and shareholder interests
coincide.
The piecewise regression (Table 5, model 2) results support the conclusion derived from
model 1. Over the interval 0–8.7%, MO has a negative, statistically significant effect at the
5% level on TPM. This is further evidence of misalignment. It has a positive, statistically
significant (5% level) effect over the interval 8.7–32%, which is further evidence for align-
ment. Over the interval 32–57.2%, the effect is negative and statistically significant, but only
at the 10% level. This is weak evidence for the entrenchment hypothesis. After 57.2% of
managerial ownership, the relationship between MO and TPM seems to break down, proba-
bly because at this level of ownership the managers own so much of the company that their
preferences coincide with those of the normal shareholder to the extent that there is nothing
to be gained from further increases.
21 The Koyck duration is calculated as [ln(1−p)/ln(1−γ)] (for more information see Koyck 1954). The
Koyck duration interval measures the time lag between a change in managerial ownership and the moment
that p percent of its effect has decayed.
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Overall, our results show that there is a statistically significant relationship between man-
agerial ownership and our measure of firm performance. This relationship is non-linear, as
suggested elsewhere in the literature based on other, less comprehensive measures of per-
formance. We find that alignment occurs at ownership levels between 8.7 and 32% and
above 57.2%. Between 32 and 57.2% we find evidence for misalignment and entrenchment.
Interestingly and importantly, we find that at very low levels of MO (up to 8.7%) increas-
ing managerial ownership actually exacerbates the agency conflict of manager/shareholder
misalignment and reduces performance.
4 Analyzing and testing TPM’s information content
4.1 TPM versus the rawmoments of the return distribution
In Sect. 2 we showed that TPM represents a broad measure of firm performance that is
measured over the entire empirical distribution of shareholder returns and, thus, reflects
returns to shareholders as well as how those returns are distributed. In the preceding section
we documented a strong statistical, non-linear relationship between TPM and MO. In this
section we study whether and how TPM contributes to understanding firm performance. We
start by testing the relationship between MO and the first four moments of the distribution of
the raw returns and analyzing their effect on shareholder utility. We then compare the results
with those of TPM in Table 5. We show that MO significantly affects the individual moments
of firm returns, but the effects on whether or not they enhance the risk averse shareholder’s
utility are often conflicting.
Consider, for example, the results on the piecewise regressions reported in Table 6. In
the first segment from 0 to 8.7%, returns, skewness and kurtosis decrease with MO, while
volatility increases. Increased volatility and decreased returns and skewness are bad for
risk averse investors, whereas decreased kurtosis is good. The trade-offs reflected in this
conflicting information is resolved with TPM. The piecewise regressions Table 5 shows
that the overall effect of MO from 0 to 8.7% on TPM is negative and significant. Over the
second segment, the information does not conflict. Returns and skewness increase with MO,
while volatility and kurtosis decrease, all of which is good for the risk averse investor, a
result verified by the positive coefficient for TPM in Table 5 for the same segment. In the
3rd segment in Table 6, returns increase and volatility decreases, which is good for the risk
averse investor, but skewness decreases and kurtosis increases, which is bad. Furthermore,
none of the coefficients are significant. Based on returns alone or returns and volatility as the
performance indicators, the conclusion would be no significant relationship or a weak positive
one. Based on all four moments, no significant relationship would be forthcoming. Using
TPM as the performance measure makes it possible to reconcile this conflicting information.
In column 2 of Table 5 the coefficient of MO on TPM, which reflects the trade-offs of these
four moments, is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. In the fourth segment,
all moments increase with MO and only the coefficient for volatility is statistically significant.
Thus, there are two good effects (increased returns and skewness) and two bad ones (increased
volatility and kurtosis). Taken together these results are difficult to interpret with respect to
overall stock performance. The results for TPM in Table 5 show a negative coefficient that is
not statistically different from zero at any reasonable level of significance, which is evidence
that for MO above 57%, there is no overall relationship between stock performance and MO.
The gist of this analysis is that examining the effect of MO on individual measures of stock
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Table 6 GMM system results for piecewise moments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RET VOL SKE KUR
RETt−1 −0.122**
(−5.14)
VOLt−1 0.512**
(20.69)
SKEt−1 0.149**
(2.86)
KURt−1 0.163**
(2.90)
MO [0–8.7%] −4.373** 0.228** −7.549** −2.595
(−19.09) (15.61) (−5.99) (−0.23)
MO (8.7–32%] 1.684** −0.0806** 2.986** −9.134
(8.74) (−6.83) (2.75) (−0.93)
MO (32–57.2%] 0.0480 −0.0209 −2.235 1.747
(0.14) (−1.01) (−1.14) (0.10)
MO (57.2–100%] 1.372 0.263* 9.665 10.23
(0.57) (1.83) (0.71) (0.08)
INST 0.607** −0.0296** 0.104 −0.680
(35.99) (−26.13) (1.14) (−0.78)
SIZE −0.0510** −0.000,857** −0.183** 0.0908
(−10.82) (−2.58) (−6.50) (0.38)
LEV −0.355** 0.0544** −0.0602 −1.291
(−7.05) (17.27) (−0.21) (−0.50)
DIV −0.876** 0.0404** −1.174 −27.45*
(−2.77) (2.08) (−0.65) (−1.68)
AGE 0.00677** −0.000114** 0.0165** −0.0988**
(15.46) (−4.23) (6.51) (−4.07)
AUD4 −0.0419 0.00931** −0.205 −5.127**
(−0.88) (3.29) (−0.74) (−2.18)
Constant 0.482** 0.0198** 2.111** 11.48**
(11.30) (5.11) (8.44) (5.40)
N 13017 13,017 13,017 13,017
F-test 201.66** 231.97** 17.85** 9.64**
Sargan test 3.69 3.84 9.19 5.67
AR (1) −19.22** −21** −11.73** −10.29**
AR (2) 1.19 1.12 1.61 1.02
The dependent variable are: raw mean return (RET) in model 1, firm volatility (VOL) in model 2, skewness (SKE)
in model 3, kurtosis (KUR) in model 4. MO [0–8.7%], (8.7–32%], (32–57.2%] and (57.2–100%] are sub-samples of
MO based on the level of managerial ownership. INST is the total shares held by financial institutions to total number
of shares. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEV is total debts to total assets. DIV is total cash dividends
to total assets. AGE is the age of the company. AUD4 is a dummy variable indicating whether a company is audited
by one of the big four auditing companies. The models are estimated using GMM System and include year dummies.
Columns (1) and (2) give the GMM system estimates where all the independent variables are treated as endogenous.
Second lag period and earlier are used as instruments. F-test is a test of the joint significance of reported coefficient
estimates under null hypothesis. Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions under the null of instrument validity.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first and second order serial correlation in residuals. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05
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performance provides a partial and potentially misleading picture of overall performance that
can be resolved by using the more comprehensive TPM.
4.2 TPM versus Tobin’s Q
We now turn our attention to examining the relationship between TPM and Tobin’s Q vis-à-
vis managerial ownership. TPM represents the performance proxy for expected utility in the
investment literature. As outlined above, Tobin’s Q, defined as the ratio of the market value
of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is measured as the
book value of assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, is often
used in the corporate finance literature as the wealth variable to proxy for firm performance.
To explore the relationships among TPM, Tobin’s Q and MO, we begin by testing the rela-
tionship between TPM and Tobin’s Q in a regression of TPM on Tobin’s Q. We find a strong,
significant relationship. Tobin’s Q is significant at the 1% level and the overall equation has
an R2 of 17%.22 The implication is that TPM reflects the performance information contained
in Tobin’s Q. We then save the residuals from this regression and re-run the regressions of
Table 5 with the saved residuals in place of TPM. The intuition behind this test is straight-
forward. The residuals, orthogonalized with respect to Tobin’s Q, contain all the information
included in TPM after eliminating the effect of Tobin’s Q. The results of this regression
measure the effect of MO on expected utility net of the Tobin’s Q wealth effect. If the effect
of managerial ownership on firm performance is predominantly a wealth effect, then using
TPM instead of Tobin’s Q for this type of analysis should offer no additional benefits. In this
case we should find no relationship between the residuals and MO. The results are reported in
Table 7. Clearly, there is a strong relationship between the residuals and MO. The magnitude
of the coefficients is different to those reported in Table 5, which is expected because we
removed the wealth effect from TPM. Besides that, the results reported in Tables 5 and 7 are
identical. This is strong evidence that TPM provides additional insights into the effect of MO
on firm performance.
5 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we propose a methodology to address the problem of heterogenous and unknown
shareholder utility functions that make it difficult to define a corporate objective common
to all shareholders based on maximum utility. Using the concept of ranked marginal utility,
we develop a multi-dimensional measure of firm performance that reflects the preferences
of all risk averse shareholders towards all aspects of risk. We verify empirically that this is,
in fact, the case for the first four moments of a large sample of US stocks over the period
2002–2010. When we use TPM in the manager/shareholder agency conflict, we show that it
provides some novel insights. First of all, we verify that the non-linear relationship between
managerial ownership and firm performance documented in the literature holds for TPM. We
show that TPM reflects the trade-offs in utility caused by changes in the first four moments
of the return distribution and that one dimensional performance measures, such as mean
returns, volatility or Tobin’s Q can lead to erroneous inference. Importantly, we also show
that after orthogonalizing with respect to Tobin’s Q, TPM contains significant information
content on shareholder preferences. By including shareholder preferences towards risk in
22 The complete results are available on request.
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Table 7 GMM system results for
TPM information not included in
Tobin’s q
(1) (2)
TPM res TPM res
TPM rest−1 0.440** 0.431**
(14.97) (14.46)
MO −23.37**
(−6.39)
MO2 208.1**
(5.40)
MO3 −549.0**
(−4.65)
MO4 441.0**
(4.11)
MO [0–8.7%] −10.35**
(−6.98)
MO (8.7–32%] 6.334**
(5.38)
MO (32–57.2%] −3.630*
(−1.72)
MO (57.2–100%] −5.678
(−0.42)
INST −0.600** −0.577**
(−3.92) (−3.75)
SIZE −0.234** −0.249**
(−7.99) (−8.30)
LEV 1.831** 1.971**
(5.31) (5.68)
DIV 1.411 1.127
(0.67) (0.53)
AGE 0.0262** 0.0279**
(9.69) (10.07)
AUD4 −0.593** −0.606**
(−2.10) (−2.06)
Constant 2.167** 2.285**
(7.81) (8.13)
N 13,017 13,017
F-test 88.38** 88.71**
Sargan test 56.32 42.07
AR (1) −22.21** −21.88
AR (2) 0.15 0.14
The dependent variable is TPM
res, which is the total
performance measure orthogonal
on Tobin’s q. MO is the level of
managerial ownership and is
measured as the number of shares
held by firm executive directors
to total number of shares. MO2 is
the square term of MO and MO3
is the cube term of MO. MO
[0–8.7%], (8.7–32%],
(32–57.2%] and (57.2–100%] are
sub-samples of MO based on the
level of managerial ownership.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of
total assets. INST is the total
shares held by financial
institutions to total number of
shares. LEV is total debts to total
assets. DIV is total cash
dividends to total assets. AGE is
the age of the company. AUD4 is
a dummy variable indicating
whether a company is audited by
one of the big four auditing
companies. The models are
estimated using GMM System
and include year dummies.
Columns (1) and (2) give the
GMM system estimates where all
the independent variables are
treated as endogenous. Second
lag period and earlier are used as
instruments. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05
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the measure of firm performance as the corporate objective, we bring together the corporate
finance literature and the literature on portfolio investment theory and practice.
OpenAccess This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide
a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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